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Abstract 
People have always been in pursuit of moral values and right conduct since the beginning of 
the mankind. However, leading an honest and earnest life is not an easy task. Aristotle, one 
of the greatest philosophers in history, argues that virtue is a habit which can be learned and 
gained through practice. This study is a modest attempt to examine Aristotelian theory of 
virtue ethics in his landmark work of Nicomachean Ethics and aims to push our thinking 
about being virtuous and leading righteous way of life.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
“What ought we to do?” is the central question that concerns modern ethical 
theorists. The deontologist, the divine command theorist, the consequentialist, and the egoist 
all propose basic moral values that tell us how to behave in morally complex situations 
(Geirsson & Holmgren, 2000). However, advocates of virtue ethics believe that modern 
theories that focus on what we should do lack something important, and suggest that it is 
equally important, or even more important that we focus on the question of what 
characteristic traits individuals ought to develop in themselves (Geirsson & Holmgren, 
2000).  
Slote (2004) states that virtue ethics involve two distinctive elements. Virtue ethics 
treat areatic notions, such as “good” or “excellence”, rather than deontic notions, such as 
obligation, ought, right, and morally wrong (Slote, 2004). In pointing out the difference 
between virtue ethics and modern moral theories, Slote (2000) stresses that most modern 
ethical theorists believe “rightness as a matter of producing good results or conforming to 
moral rules or principles, but virtue ethics specify what is moral in relation to such inner 
factors as character and motive” (Slote, 2000 p. 325).  
Hursthouse (2003) also points out the difference of virtue ethics from other ethical 
theories. The author stresses that in contrast to deontological theories which emphasize rules 
or duties, or the theories that focus on the consequences of actions,  the core of the virtue 
ethics theory is in the heart or character of the individual (Hursthouse, 2003). The virtue 
ethics explains the characteristics of a virtuous person and suggests that individuals can 
develop moral character over time through habitual action and practice (Geirsson & 
Holmgren, 2000).  The theory is important in addressing many ethical problems since virtue 
and moral character “provides the wisdom necessary for applying rules in particular 
instances” (Hinman, 2006).  
The term virtue ethics originates from ancient Greek word “arete” meaning 
“excellence” or “virtue” (Hursthouse, 2003). Although the term “arete” is often translated as 
virtue, Annas (1998) states that it means “excellence”, not virtue. In one sense, “arete” 
means anything that reaches completion (Annas, 1998). 
The origins of the theory date back to ancient Greek philosophy, especially to Plato 
and Aristotle. Aristotle’s famous work “Nicomachean Ethics” is especially important in that 
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it is “the first systematic treatment of ethics in Western philosophy” (Gensler, et. al., 2004). 
Following paragraphs aim to examine Aristotelian theory of virtue ethics in his landmark 
work of Nicomachean Ethics.  
 
2. ARISTOTLE (384-322 BC) 
The Greek philosopher Aristotle is considered to be one of the greatest philosophers 
of all time. He was a student of Plato’s, and the personal tutor of Alexander the Great. He 
wrote on a wide range of a philosophical and nonphilosophical subjects, including biology, 
literature, politics, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. His famous work, the Nicomachean Ethics, 
contains his theory of the virtues (Geirsson & Holmgren, 2000).   
Aristotle’s theory begins with the assumption that “all actions aim at a good” 
(Gensler, et. al., 2004). Aristotle (350 B.C.E.) states that every art and every investigation, 
and likewise every pursuit and every action, aims at some good; therefore, the good has been 
defined as the object at which everything aims. Aristotle further states that there in not one 
single good. As there are many sciences and branches of knowledge, there are 
correspondingly numerous ends at which they aim (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). For instance, the 
aim of the medicine is producing health; the economics is acquiring wealth, etc.  
 
Eudaimonia  
Aristotle later poses a simple question: what is the good and what is the highest of the 
goods achievable by action? The answer to this question is happiness, which Aristotle calls 
“eudaimonia”. In general terms, eudaimonia is often translated as well-being, happiness, 
flourishing, and success. Aristotle defines eudaimonia as “an activity of the soul according to 
complete excellence/virtue over a complete life” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.p. 58). Geirsson & 
Holmgren (2000) states that in Aristotle’s view, eudaimonia is tied to living rationally and 
considering rationality, which distinguishes human being from animals. Aristotle states that 
happiness is the most desirable of all things. It is “something final and complete in itself, as 
being the aim and end of all practical activities whatever” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. pp. 58, 59).   
According to Aristotle, there is a general agreement on the answer of this question. 
Both ordinary people and educated people define the good as happiness; however, with 
regard to what constitutes happiness, people’s opinions differ (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
Ordinary people identify happiness as something plain and visible, such as wealth, pleasure, 
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or honor. While the definition varies among people, even same person may sometimes give 
different definitions (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). For example, when a person is ill, he identifies 
happiness with health, and he identifies it with wealth when he is poor. The other group of 
people that Aristotle calls “people of superior refinement and active disposition” (Aristotle, 
350 B.C.E. pp. 241) identifies happiness with honor. These group of people pursue honor 
simply because they believe virtue is better, and to convince themselves of their goodness 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  
 
Virtue 
Aristotle suggests that to better understand the nature of happiness we must 
investigate the nature of virtue, since happiness is “the active exercise of the mind in 
conformity with perfect goodness of virtue” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. pp. 63). According to 
Aristotle, virtue is a habit which can be learned and gained through practice. Aristotle 
believes that people can be taught to be virtuous, which can have important implications for 
moral education (Hinman, 2006). Aristotle notes that human virtue does not mean bodily 
excellence, but the excellence of the soul.  
Aristotle separates virtue into two categories: intellectual virtues and moral virtues. 
“Intellectual virtues enable us to think rationally, whereas moral virtues enable us to handle 
our desires and emotions rationally” (Geirsson & Holmgren, 2000 p. 211). According to 
Aristotle, “a good intellect is chiefly produced and fostered by education, but moral 
goodness is formed mainly by training in habit” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 63).  
Of nine intellectual virtues that Aristotle identified, only practical wisdom cannot be 
thought, but can be learned through experience (Geirsson & Holmgren, 2000). According to 
Aristotle, the moral virtues, such as justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, can be 
acquired through practice and habitual action (Geirsson & Holmgren, 2000). This 
assumption leads Aristotle to an interesting conclusion: none of the moral virtues are formed 
in human by nature since natural characteristics can never be changed (Aristotle, 350 
B.C.E.).  To  illustrate,  Aristotle  states  that  nothing  that  naturally  acts  in  one  way  can  be  
trained to act in another way; for instance, a stone naturally moves downwards and cannot be 
educated to move upward even if one were to try to accustom it to do so by casting it up into 
the air thousands of times (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). Consequently, Aristotle suggests that the 
virtues are not implanted in human by nature, but they result from the natural capacity of 
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individuals to acquire those virtues by developing that capacity through training (Aristotle, 
350 B.C.E.). 
Aristotle further makes distinctions between virtues and endowments. Endowments 
are given us by nature, and we receive the power of using them first and later exercise these 
endowments in action (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). This is most obvious in the case of our sense 
faculties, such as sight and hearing. We possessed our senses when we started, not acquired 
them by hearing and seeing them repeatedly (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
However, in the case of virtues, we acquire them by first acting virtuously (Aristotle, 
350 B.C.E.). According to Aristotle, it is just like a craftsman learns his art by doing things 
he needs to do. For example, by building houses men become builders and by playing harp 
become harpers (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). Similarly, people become just by acting justly, 
become self-controlled by acting temperately, and become courageous by acting bravely 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
Aristotle further states that even if acts are in conformity with virtues, it does not 
necessarily mean that they are done temperately or justly. He emphasizes on three conditions 
that a person needs to have when doing them: first “he must have knowledge, secondly he 
must choose the acts for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 244). Basing his arguments on these three 
conditions, Aristotle reaches an important conclusion: “Actions are called just and temperate 
when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do, but it is not the man who does 
these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate man 
do them” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p.244). 
 
Virtue: a state of character 
Aristotle next focus on what virtue is. According to Aristotle, there exist three kinds 
of things in the soul: passions, faculties, and state of character; and virtue must be one of 
these (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). By passions Aristotle means the feelings generally related to 
pleasure or pain, such as anger, appetite, fear, confidence, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, 
longing, envy, and pity (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). Aristotle defines faculties as “the things in 
virtue of which we are capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being angry or 
being pained or feeling pity (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 244). As for states of characters, they 
are “the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions” 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 244). For instance, with reference to anger, if we feel it too weakly 
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or violently we stand badly, and if we feel it moderately then we stand well (Aristotle, 350 
B.C.E.). 
Aristotle states that virtues and vices are not passions because people are called good 
or bad on the grounds of their virtues and vices, not on the grounds of their passions 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). For the same reason, virtues are not faculties since no body can be 
blamed or praised, called good or bad on the grounds of their faculties. Furthermore, unlike 
passions and faculties, “virtues are mode of choice or involve choice” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. 
p. 245). Aristotle concludes that if the virtues are not passions and faculties, then they must 
be states of character (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).   
Aristotle not only describes virtue as a state of character, but he also discusses what 
kind of state it is. “The virtue of man is the state of character which makes a man good and 
which makes him do his own work well” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 246) 
Aristotle emphasizes on the middle state as a virtuous state of character, and suggests that 
both deficiency and excess are essentially detrimental (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). He illustrates 
that both eating too little and too much is detrimental for health; and similarly, both taking 
too much and too little exercise impairs bodily health. Aristotle makes a generalization and 
states that there is defect, excess, and intermediate in every action and passion (Aristotle, 350 
B.C.E.).  
According to Aristotle, this also applies to virtues: “virtue must have the quality of 
aiming at the intermediate” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 245). For instance, while courage is a 
virtue, a man becomes coward when he cannot stand his ground when necessary, and he 
becomes foolhardy when he is not afraid of anything and walks into everything (Aristotle, 
350 B.C.E.).  Similarly, confidence and fear, pity and anger, and pain and pleasure may all 
be felt too much or too little, which is not good in both cases. (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.) Feeling 
them to the right people at the right times, in the right way and with the right intent is 
intermediate, and this is the characteristic of virtue (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). Thus, Aristotle 
concludes that “a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and 
chooses this” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  
Aristotle also notes that not every action or every emotion has a middle state. Their 
names already suggest “badness”, such as envy and shamelessness; and among actions 
murder, theft, and adultery. (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). These actions and emotions are bad 
intrinsically, not when they are practiced too much or insufficiently (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
They are always wrong and it is not possible to commit or feel them rightly; for instance, it is 
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not  possible  to  commit  adultery  with  right  woman in  the  right  place  and  at  the  right  time 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
Aristotle notes that the intermediate is not in the object, but it is relative to human. It 
means that what the “too much”, what the “too little”, and what the “intermediate” is 
depends on the person (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). Geirsson & Holmgren (2000) draw attention 
to the relativity of the middle state of the character. Accordingly, “there are no rules or 
formulas for finding the mean, and we cannot determine where the mean is to be found 
independent of the circumstances in which it occurs” (Geirsson & Holmgren, 2000 p. 211). 
For example, while ten pounds of food is too much for an ordinary person, it may be 
intermediate for a sportsman since he needs more energy than other people to maintain his 
strength (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
 
Choice 
Aristotle believes that choice is highly related to virtue and better discriminator of 
character than actions (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). Since choice plays an important role in 
Aristotle’s understanding of virtue, he discusses choice in detail to describe what exactly it 
is. In particular, he makes some distinctions between choice and voluntary action, and 
between choice and wish, on which he later bases his arguments on virtue-choice relations.   
Aristotle states that choice is voluntary, but not every voluntary action is made by 
choice. For instance, children and animals involve in voluntary actions; however, they do not 
choose their action, rather they act on the spur of the moment (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  
In drawing distinctions between choice and wish, Aristotle states that choice is not wish, 
although it seems close to it; because, people may wish for impossible but choice cannot 
relate to impossible (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). For instance, a man can wish for immortality, 
but cannot choose it. Choices are the things that can be brought about by one’s own efforts 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  In other words, choice relates to the means while wish relates to the 
ends. For example, everybody wishes to be healthy, but everyone choose the acts that will 
make them healthy (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
Aristotle further points out that we think about means, but not ends. According to 
Aristotle, we think about things that can be done and that are in our power. For instance, a 
doctor does not deliberate that his patient will heal, rather he assumes the end and considers 
how to achieve it, and if there are more than one mean to achieve the end, he considers 
which the best and easy one is (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).   
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Aristotle continues that since ends are what we wish for and means are what we think and 
choose, actions about means must be voluntary and involve choice (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
Considering that exercise of the virtues is related to means, both virtue and vice are in our 
own power (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  It is in our power to act and not to act, which in both 
cases are the choices we make (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
 
Contemplation 
Aristotle suggests that if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, then it should 
be in conformity with the highest virtue, which is the best thing in us. Aristotle calls this 
contemplative. Aristotle contends that this is in agreement with his arguments on virtue and 
with the truth. It is because this activity is the best and furthermore, it is the most continuous, 
since people contemplate truth more continuously than they can do anything (Aristotle, 350 
B.C.E.). Aristotle believes that real happiness and pleasure is mingled with it (Aristotle, 350 
B.C.E.). 
 
3. CONCLUSION: HOW TO HIT THE MIDDLE COURSE? 
In  brief,  Aristotle  shows  in  his  famous  work  of  Nicomachean  Ethics  that  moral  
goodness is a middle state, which is an intermediate between two vices: excess and 
deficiency. “It holds this position in virtue of its quality of aiming to hit the middle point in 
emotions and actions”(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 67). 
Emphasizing on the difficulty of aiming at a middle course, Aristotle proposes three 
rules to help us achieve to hit the mean and be a virtuous person. First rule is “to keep well 
away from that extreme which is the more opposite to it” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 68). For 
of two extremes, deficiency and excess, one is a worse mistake than the other.  Aristotle 
suggests  that  since  to  hit  the  middle  point  is  extremely  difficult,  “we must  sail  the  second 
best way” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. pp. 68, 69). 
The second rule that Aristotle suggests is to be aware of the mistakes to which we are 
most vulnerable. Everybody is different in terms of their natural tendency to different faults. 
We can and should discover our tendencies_ what faults we are prone to_ and try to go in the 
opposite direction (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). 
Lastly, we must always try to see pleasant things and pleasant feelings in everything 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). According to Aristotle, these three measures are the best way to 
enable us to hit the middle course.   
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As Aristotle  emphasized,  to  be  virtuous  is  not  an  easy  task.   It  is  easy  to  miss  the  
target  than  to  hit  it,  and  to  Aristotle,  this  is  why  going  wrong  is  easy  but  going  right  is  
difficult (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.). For this reason, “right conduct is rare and praiseworthy and 
noble” (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E. p. 68). 
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